This paper aims
to demonstrate the intrinsic circularity existing between the agent and his
context. To give evidence of this theory, it will be necessary to investigate
the extensive concept of ethos, the meanings of which embrace both individual
and collective dimension. Moreover, this itinerary through the Aristotelian
thought will be the occasion for putting the rebirth of interest towards
Ancient Philosophy into question.
Virtue ethics is
currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially,
be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in
contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rulesor that emphasizes the
consequences of actions .Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be
helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so
will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the
agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as
you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person
would be charitable or benevolent. Hence, the landscape of ethical debate has
become re-articulated from two ways of thinking to three: Consequentialism and
Kantian ethics, joined together, and Virtue Ethics, whose roots are generally
in ancient philosophy and, especially, in Aristotle. But Slote’s work also
offers us a deeper key to understanding the interpretative battlefield, by explaining
why Consequentialism and Kantian’s dyad are not able to completely satisfy the
necessity of thinking the praxis. The reason lies in the dominant property that
characterizes them: they are actfocused, in the manner that they look for moral
rules that are supposed to govern human actions.
According to
Slote, this polarization of the action swallows up a fundamental part of
morality, the one regarding the self and the moral agent. Conversely, Virtue
Ethics is actually qualified for being agent-focused, that is to say that the
focus is on the virtuous individual and on those inner traits, dispositions,
and motives that qualify him as being virtuous. So, Virtue Ethics is born
exactly because of the necessity of rethinking the importance of the self, of the
agent and of his entire characteristics, in contrast with the abstraction and
the focus on action of the normative theories Aristotle also defines virtue in
a manner different from what we are generally taught in schools, but it is much
closer to how we think on an everyday basis. We are taught that courage is the
opposite of cowardice, and generosity the opposite of miserliness, etc.
However, Aristotle defines virtue as the mean between two extremes that need to
be avoided. For example, cowardice is having too much fear while foolhardiness
is the complete absence of fear. Courage is having the right amount of fear
which tempers our actions even as we stand up against an obstacle. A coward may
run away from battle while a foolhardy person may rush headlong into battle. A
courageous person will stand and fight along with his comrades, and will press
forward or take cover as the situation demands. Another virtue is being witty,
which lies between the extremes of being a boor, who takes offence at everything
and fouls everybody's mood, and being a buffoon, who takes everything lightly
and cannot spare anyone and anything from ridicule. A witty person, however,
knows how to be humorous without going over the top, but at the same time is
grounded enough to know that jokes are just jokes and are not to be taken too
seriously. One can see how commonsensical Aristotle's conception of virtue is.
We have always said things like "She's too nice to a fault" or
"He's works too hard". But such statements make no sense when we see
virtues and vices as binary oppositions.
In conclusion, by
briefly summing up some of the most relevant points emerged in the paper. They
are principally two. First the intimate contiguity and bidirectionality between
individual ethos and collective one. Second the impasse of the distance and the
solution of the contingence. The demonstration of the first theme has occupied
all the initial section and has been encouraged by the reconstruction of the
contemporary debate. Then, the clarified necessity of rethinking the moral
agent has supported the examination of practical philosophy, guided by the
inclusive concept of ethos. An itinerary through a composite complex of
Aristotelian writings. From one side, we have the metabolization or habituation
process, denoted with the induced virtue. From the other side, we have the
co-existence of different levels of freedom, identified with the two practices
of practical reason, phronesis and politike episteme. Moreover, another
fundamental characteristic of Aristotelian practical philosophy has come to
light: the constant balance between desire and reason. Its examination is
unavoidable in order to fully understand the circularity just mentioned,
because it gives reason of all the dimensions involved in the inner workings
behind the above-seen expression. Therefore it must always be accompanied by an
immanent point of view, that has to take the peculiarities of each specific
context and historical situation into consideration.
