This paper aims to demonstrate the intrinsic circularity existing between the agent and his context. To give evidence of this theory, it will be necessary to investigate the extensive concept of ethos, the meanings of which embrace both individual and collective dimension. Moreover, this itinerary through the Aristotelian thought will be the occasion for putting the rebirth of interest towards Ancient Philosophy into question.

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rulesor that emphasizes the consequences of actions .Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent. Hence, the landscape of ethical debate has become re-articulated from two ways of thinking to three: Consequentialism and Kantian ethics, joined together, and Virtue Ethics, whose roots are generally in ancient philosophy and, especially, in Aristotle. But Slote’s work also offers us a deeper key to understanding the interpretative battlefield, by explaining why Consequentialism and Kantian’s dyad are not able to completely satisfy the necessity of thinking the praxis. The reason lies in the dominant property that characterizes them: they are actfocused, in the manner that they look for moral rules that are supposed to govern human actions.

According to Slote, this polarization of the action swallows up a fundamental part of morality, the one regarding the self and the moral agent. Conversely, Virtue Ethics is actually qualified for being agent-focused, that is to say that the focus is on the virtuous individual and on those inner traits, dispositions, and motives that qualify him as being virtuous. So, Virtue Ethics is born exactly because of the necessity of rethinking the importance of the self, of the agent and of his entire characteristics, in contrast with the abstraction and the focus on action of the normative theories Aristotle also defines virtue in a manner different from what we are generally taught in schools, but it is much closer to how we think on an everyday basis. We are taught that courage is the opposite of cowardice, and generosity the opposite of miserliness, etc. However, Aristotle defines virtue as the mean between two extremes that need to be avoided. For example, cowardice is having too much fear while foolhardiness is the complete absence of fear. Courage is having the right amount of fear which tempers our actions even as we stand up against an obstacle. A coward may run away from battle while a foolhardy person may rush headlong into battle. A courageous person will stand and fight along with his comrades, and will press forward or take cover as the situation demands. Another virtue is being witty, which lies between the extremes of being a boor, who takes offence at everything and fouls everybody's mood, and being a buffoon, who takes everything lightly and cannot spare anyone and anything from ridicule. A witty person, however, knows how to be humorous without going over the top, but at the same time is grounded enough to know that jokes are just jokes and are not to be taken too seriously. One can see how commonsensical Aristotle's conception of virtue is. We have always said things like "She's too nice to a fault" or "He's works too hard". But such statements make no sense when we see virtues and vices as binary oppositions.

In conclusion, by briefly summing up some of the most relevant points emerged in the paper. They are principally two. First the intimate contiguity and bidirectionality between individual ethos and collective one. Second the impasse of the distance and the solution of the contingence. The demonstration of the first theme has occupied all the initial section and has been encouraged by the reconstruction of the contemporary debate. Then, the clarified necessity of rethinking the moral agent has supported the examination of practical philosophy, guided by the inclusive concept of ethos. An itinerary through a composite complex of Aristotelian writings. From one side, we have the metabolization or habituation process, denoted with the induced virtue. From the other side, we have the co-existence of different levels of freedom, identified with the two practices of practical reason, phronesis and politike episteme. Moreover, another fundamental characteristic of Aristotelian practical philosophy has come to light: the constant balance between desire and reason. Its examination is unavoidable in order to fully understand the circularity just mentioned, because it gives reason of all the dimensions involved in the inner workings behind the above-seen expression. Therefore it must always be accompanied by an immanent point of view, that has to take the peculiarities of each specific context and historical situation into consideration.